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The land of literature is a fairy land to those who view it at a distance, but, like 




The place that the offerings of the artistic vision occupy in the Western cultural 
tradition, particularly with regard to the conceptions of the Good Life, has 
always been at once vague and precarious. During the period of Athenian democ­
racy the artistic vision flourished; but Plato banished artists from his Republic. 
During the Enlightenment, following Kant, Schiller held that the task of art is to 
educate humanity; but Hegel argued that art had been superceded by philosophy 
as the clearest statement about the designs of God in history. In the afterglow of 
the Enlightenment, art was seen as a handmaiden to politics—by the right and 
the left. Then, almost as a last gasp, artists and critics asserted art as self-suffi­
cient: Vart pour I’art. The retreat into pure form was apparently unsuccessful. 
There are those today who claim that the aesthetic daemon, as God, is dead.^ 
Within this problematic position of art in Western culture, literature offers an 
even more precarious case. For centuries it trailed behind the other arts in being 
regarded as an adequate vehicle for offering enduring insights into the human 
condition, even among those willing and able to appreciate the artistic tempera­
ment. No doubt the suspicion endured largely because of literature’s close prox­
imity to the populace, the everyday, the temporal, and hence, the ephemeral.
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Poetry gained reluctant acceptance as a proper vehicle to talk about the Good 
Life in large measure because it claimed to have overcome the weight of time 
and to have grasped veritable essences. The case for the novel—produced for 
mass consumption—as a proper form of artistic expression was still being 
assessed by the middle of this century.^
ON THE PERIPHERY
It is self-evident that questions concerning the Good Life are, necessarily, ethical 
questions. Therefore, they must engage ongoing political and economic debates. 
Furthermore, given Europe’s political and economic ascendancy in world history, 
particularly since the fifteenth century, it was inevitable that the controversies 
regarding artistic visions of the Good Life would ricochet, not only within but 
also beyond the European cultural borders. In effect, ever since then, an increas­
ing sector of humanity—those inhabiting the so-called third-world countries— 
have been deeply affected by debates in which they did not participate. Once their 
traditional notions of Beauty or Truth had been undermined by an aggressive 
European animus, the discussions concerning the Good Life were carried out 
under the watchful eyes of colonial centers of power. As a consequence, the eth­
ical dimensions of art dispersed as echoes of faraway realities. This was certainly 
tme in the case of Latin America; at least until the middle of this century.
VARGAS LLOSA: LITERATURE AS PROTEST
Within the Latin American tradition, conceived as an extension of the Western 
world, the Peruvian writer/critic Mario Vargas Llosa (1936- ) must be consid­
ered among those who have most vociferously argued for embracing literature in 
general and the novel in particular, as proper vehicles for saying something 
meaningful about the Good Life. What are Vargas Llosa’s reasons for making the 
claim? Why should we accept his proposition?
From very early on, Vargas Llosa has conceived literature—the act of writing 
it and secondarily the act of reading it—as a form of protest. With nuanced exten­
sions and restrictions, he has retained this initial appraisal. In a general sense, he 
posits, literature translates humanity’s protest against the finitude, the bounded­
ness, of its condition. It expresses a discontentment with our limitations as per­
ceived against the free play of our imagination. Through the act of writing—and 
of reading—we make light of the heavy chains of the mundane. In other words, 
following in the footsteps of Georg Lukacs and Walter Benjamin, Vargas Llosa 
posits that literature always says “and yet” to life. In a more particular sense, Var­
gas Llosa holds that literature is also a protest against the concrete evils of the 
writer’s reality. These concrete evils provide the occasion for the creative act;
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they are the necessary instantiations of a general condition. Without a protesting 
animus, both against life itself and against its evil instantiations, the literary act 
is impossible.^
In protesting against the limits of the human condition, holds Vargas Llosa, lit­
erature expands our horizons. In its innermost core, the literary vision strives to 
express the manifoldness of the human experience, and hence to teach us some­
thing essential about ourselves: that we all have a share in the common, tempo­
ral project; that history is the trail of our common hope. In disclosing for us this 
essential Truth, the literary vision overflows all limitations.
GOOD AND EVIL
In principle, the guiding animus of literature is to examine the Good as well as 
the Evil side of our humanity. Therefore, the overflowing of boundaries cannot 
be seen as an inevitable movement toward the Sublime. Early in his career, Var­
gas Llosa followed George Bataille rather closely. Literature, he argued, 
expresses best the Evil side of the human condition. This meant the writer expe­
riences, examines, and discloses that which the rest of us would rather keep from 
view. There was more: it was not only that literature provides the occasion for 
reflection on such Evil reality. Literature, Vargas Llosa argued then, sustains, 
defends, even admires, the Evil side of humanity. And yet, it is important to note 
that, even in the moments when he was closest to Bataille, Vargas Llosa managed 
to put some distance between them. While agreeing that literature must often 
begin from the Evil side, he also noted that, when seen in its proper dimensions, 
literature is most profound when it strives to speak about the totality of human 
experience.'*
The need for such a corrective is self-evident. The literary act is more than a 
vehicle for the release of pent-up resentment, forbidden desires, or hidden dae­
mons. The artistic vision strains to offer us glimpses of the Good Life as well. 
This position was more thoroughly developed by Vargas Llosa later in his career. 
But, of course, the matter is even more complicated than that. The very premises 
of Bataille’s offerings and Vargas Llosa’s corrective stand in need of reflection. 
How are we to understand what is Evil and what is Good in any given society, 
never mind Humanity?
CONTINGENCIES
From the standpoint of much current social theorizing, if we bracket out the 
larger question and talk only about Western societies (we must neutralize the nec­
essary nuances of even that complex, of course), the only way to make sense of 
this conception of literature is by assuming that it expresses what is considered
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Good or Evil by the “normal” society that gives it ground. In this case, what is 
Good or Evil would not be defined by the literary vision itself, but by the soci­
ety of which it is a part. The “and yet” of literature would then be grounded not 
in its own insights regarding Good and Evil, but in an already established con­
ception of the Good Life. The pugilistic stance Vargas Llosa wishes to assign to 
literature would then become contrariness. The conception of art as a particular 
kind of knowing, something Kant had celebrated, would be left behind.
Let us take a closer look. Since at least the nineteenth century—under the 
impact of the lifetime efforts by such founders of modem social theory as Marx, 
Nietzsche, Weber, Freud, and Durkheim—it has become a tmism in the Western 
sociotheoretical tradition that not only the conception of Good and Evil but also 
Good and Evil themselves are historically contingent. No modem Western intel­
lectual can now speak for Evil without, at the same time, questioning his or her 
own position; because the possibility of choosing to stand above Good and Evil 
in order to then take sides is given only with the undermining of all tmth-claims. 
One person’s Evil is always someone else’s Good. Hence, taking the side of Evil, 
or letting Evil speak—through literature—could be equally, and perhaps more 
correctly, understood as speaking for a particular conception of Good.
In general terms, Vargas Llosa agrees with the main representatives of the 
Western sociotheoretical tradition. He accepts that what he might consider Evil 
in Pemvian society—as a concrete manifestation of Evil in general—might well 
be seen as a Good by other Pemvians. There is a strong relativist component in 
his aesthetic and critical production. However (and here we encounter an instance 
of an oscillation that is endemic to his work), he does not wish to fall prey to the 
paralyzing embrace of relativism. Against the insights of Western social theory, 
he wishes to hold that literature discloses some Tmth. In other words, Vargas 
Llosa embraces Kant’s notion of the aesthetic as a way of knowing.
Furthermore, he attempts to overcome the relativism entailed in the modem 
discourse of Good and Evil by insisting that a writer ought not be interested in 
taking sides. Echoing Max Weber’s famous injunction, he holds that an artist can 
embrace the aesthetic daemon fully; that it alone ought to hold the fibers of his 
very life.^ Vargas Llosa believes, as did Weber, that objectivity can be attained by 
the sheer weight of honest commitment. But, of course, the hope nestled in the 
claim is highly debatable, to say the least.
VIRILE MATURITY
The stance above Good and Evil presupposes a writer willing and able to face the 
world devoid of illusions; perhaps to show what Georg Lukacs called “virile matu­
rity.” A difficult posture to maintain, surely. But Vargas Llosa does not believe it 
impossible; the writer can indeed approximate an Olympic figure. Contemplating 
the chaos that is human existence, the writer can attempt to provide order, if only
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in his imagined world. Contemplating a stifling existing order, the writer can 
attempt to portray mystery, playfulness, or absurdity. In other words, the writer can 
both introduce a skeptical standpoint, which helps to break the spell of the norm, 
and provide glimpses of a better world. It is in this context that the full extent of 
Vargas Llosa’s notion of the elemento anadido (added element) in literature can be 
appreciated. In his offerings, the writer intends an imaginative reconstruction of 
reality. In and through his art, argues Vargas Llosa, leaving Kant’s pietistic mod­
esty behind, the writer competes with God: he aims at rectifying His creation.® 
Needless to say, we postmodern intellectuals need convincing that the writer 
is capable of approaching an Olympic figure. Minimally, we would have to be 
shown that the notion of “genius,” that mischievous Western cultural valuation, 
conveys adequately whatever it is that makes possible the privileged standpoint 
of the artist as someone-who-knows. For there is no question that Vargas Llosa’s 
conception of the writer harks back to the Kantian conception of genius, which 
lingered for decades in the hollow halls of the Western academy. It seems as 
though it only appeared that, under the impact of modernity, such a conception 
of the artist had withered away, together with the social substratum that made it 
possible. Since Vargas Llosa claims the writer is a supplanter of God, it behooves 
us to listen. A resurrection might be in the offing.
ELEMENTOS ANADIDOS AND THE NOVEL
In his philosophical essay on the novel form, Georg Lukacs reiterates an idea that 
had been formulated with regard to bourgeois art more generally: the rise of the 
genre is deeply connected with the development of capitalism and the attendant 
modernity in the West. Therefore, the most recent literary formation is the epic 
of a world abandoned by God; it is the manifestation of radical skepticism. This 
is so, to paraphrase Octavio Paz, because the novel functions as an acid that cor­
rodes the social world; it questions the reality of reality and embraces the utter 
relativity of Good and Evil. As we have seen, Vargas Llosa concurs.^ At the same 
time, he oscillates. In a world abandoned by God, and therefore bereft of asymp­
totes for leading the Good Life, Vargas Llosa holds, the writer of novels feels an 
inner compulsion to “improve” on reality by offering Truth. In other words, 
against Lukacs’s caution, Vargas Llosa believes the writer must take upon his 
shoulders the burden of providing a more rounded and integrated world.
The literary corrective to the world of God can be seen on two levels: first, as 
an effective supplantation of God in the fictive world. That is, in literature, the 
writer can create a world taking into account humanity’s historically developed 
imaginings and desires. In this sense, literature aims to reiterate the old view of 
the aesthetic as a protest against the finitude of existence. But Vargas Llosa often 
writes and behaves as if the deicidal deed aims further. As an artist, he claims, 
the writer has something important to say about the “real” world as well. On this
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second level, the corrective act consists in adding something to reality that the 
artist either perceives as missing or intuits as repressed. In fact, the success of the 
deed can be taken as a marker for the distinction between great and lesser works. 
The elemento ahadido is the Truth offered by aesthetics.
SOURCES
The elemento ahadido, the aesthetic contribution over against God, Vargas Llosa 
claims, might issue from a variety of sources: psychological, biological, or mys­
tical, which might be felt as resentment, nostalgia, rage, or despair.* From his 
extant writing, it is difficult to ascertain exact sources. What is clear is that the 
aesthetic Truth is not necessarily grounded on Reason. Its claim to universality 
rests on its power to tap the sediment of memories and feelings that humanity has 
achieved in its long trajectory over time. Elementos ahadidos are akin to Kant­
ian synthetic judgments.
In the Western world, where the achievements of science tend to smother all 
ways of knowing save the scientific method, this elemento ahadido seems to give 
the novel an independence that permits it to tap into alternative ways of know­
ing and being. This is the main reason why the novel for Vargas Llosa could 
never be supplanted by anthropology, sociology, or psychology. The elemento 
ahadido is the contribution of an artist’s originality and creativity. The original­
ity and creativity of an author, therefore, ought not to be judged only in terms of 
technical prowess or the felicitous use of language. The function of technique is 
to enhance the possibilities of the elemento ahadido?
ELEMENTOS ANADIDOS AND LITERARY INDEPENDENCE
It is well known that writers of the Latin American “boom”—Carlos Fuentes, 
Julio Cortazar, Jose Donoso, Garcia Marquez, in addition to Vargas Llosa him­
self—wished to distance themselves from their nineteenth-century predecessors, 
who they believed had labored under misguided approaches to art (such as 
regionalism, parochial versions of naturalism and romanticism, Indigenismo, and 
social realism). In the context of art as a way of knowing, Vargas Llosa wishes 
to call attention to one particular shortcoming: the tradition of writers such as 
Giro Alegria and Romulo Gallegos was much too content to borrow not only the 
form and content of their creations from Europeans, but the elementos ahadidos 
as well. In other words, mimesis took the place of originality and creativity. This 
is the main reason why artistic works from Latin America prior to the midcen- 
tury rang hollow.
(It is interesting to note that in order to contribute his own elementos ahadidos 
to the Latin American—and the world—literary tradition, Vargas Llosa had to
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become more and more European; that he gained his originality by immersing 
himself in the tradition his predecessors had, according to him, merely copied. 
This immanent project, which demanded that he risk losing himself in order to 
know himself, has scarred the long trajectory of his love-hate relationship with 
Peru and Latin America. The trajectory reached a precarious resting place a few 
years ago when he became a Spaniard.)
LITERATURE AND FREEDOM
Gustave Flaubert was a likable bourgeois and an unlikely rebel. And yet, Vargas 
Llosa points out, it is precisely he who, through his art, has endured in the West­
ern tradition as an incisive critic of his times. Following Flaubert, Vargas Llosa 
also believes that great literature will always be dangerous to the powers that be. 
This is the reason why such powers—state, party, religion, and the Many—will 
always try to control it. The threat to literature was greater in the past, he thinks, 
when societies had not progressed enough. For history shows that the high valu­
ation of a free imagination is a good indicator of the level of civilization a soci­
ety has attained. All mature societies tolerate an active imagination; they find it 
a necessary risk—the price of freedom.'®
Vargas Llosa means to defend an artistic vision, not the animus of a political 
track. Within his Latin American tradition, he faults Indigenismo and social real­
ism for compromising the artistic vision in view of political aims. The aesthetic 
critique of reality, he reiterates, is not necessarily consciously undertaken. On the 
contrary, the most fruitful and radieal insights into alternative value systems 
offered by aesthetics issue from the unconscious play of the imagination. This 
was eertainly the case with Flaubert, whose creative genius produced insights 
that were at odds with his consciously held sociopolitical interests. His insights 
into the havoc caused by the rise of capitalism are deftly woven in his art. When 
the author is given to preaching a consciously held political position, Vargas 
Llosa holds, he courts falling prey to a paternalistic and totalitarian animus." Art 
demands absolute devotion.
OSCILLATIONS
We have encountered here the first instances of Vargas Llosa’s oscillation 
between relativism and universalism. On the one hand, he refuses to draw the 
logical conclusion of the Western sociotheoretical tradition—deftly demon­
strated by postmodernist writers such as Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan—and 
embrace relativism. On the other, he ignores the erosion of the grounding values 
of this tradition (Logos, Dialectic, Science) and holds fast to universalist values. 
In other words, Vargas Llosa wishes to have it both ways. Social theorists such
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as Marx or Freud got away with this oscillation because at the core of their the­
ories they retained untheorized positive values from the Western tradition, such 
as Justice and Freedom. In a postmodern world, such valuations are no longer 
taken for granted; they stand in need of justification. These days, even within the 
ongoing Western sociotheoretical tradition, a return to the nineteenth-century 
stance is considered either naive or disingenuous. The Kantian notion of genius 
is no longer enough.
